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Abstract 
 
The government of Pakistan introduced several agricultural credit programmes 
through institutional sources. The impact of these programmes was less than optimal due to 
rambling credit policies. The farmers were facing many constraints to avail agricultural 
credit in a timely fashion. The collateral inter alia was one of the major constraints. The 
objective of the paper is to identify constraints and suggest remedial measures to make 
efficient use of agricultural credit schemes. Majority of the farmers revealed that they could 
not avail credit because of needed collateral. The hard hits were tenants and share croppers 
who do not own land, and thus were unavailable to avail credit. The high mark up both 
from formal and informal sources was another constraint. 
The borrowing behavior of the respondents was estimated through the logit model 
and identified the determinants of credit constraints. The results showed that the 
coefficients of transitory income, education level, and predicted interest rate have important 
bearing on borrowing behavior. The household consumption expenditure was positively 
and significantly determined by operational holding and value of implements 
 
 
Keywords: Agricultural credit, Borrowing Behavior, Interest Rate, Collateral. 
 
Introduction 
The agricultural loans in Pakistan amounting to Rs. 104.8 billion were disbursed during (July-March, 
2006-07) as against Rs.91.2 billion during the corresponding period last year, thereby registering an 
increase of 15 percent (GOP, 2007). The growth momentum in rural credit suggests that the sector was 
given sufficient priority in terms of the availability of loan. However, the challenges faced by needy 
farmers as well as the lending institutions were still daunting. A large majority of needy, willing and 
able to borrow farmers generally cannot avail agricultural credit because of the procedural and 
bureaucratic lending process that favored and was skewed toward influential farmers in the rural sector. 
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Most countries including Pakistan motivated by consideration of the potential gain and the 
increase in welfare of the farmers, especially the smaller farmers, have undertaken widespread credit 
programmes. However, in most such cases, the Government intervention takes the form of interest rate 
ceiling or subsidies interest rates thereby necessitating rationing. When credit was rationed some 
borrowers could not obtain the amount of credit they desired at the prevailing interest rates, nor did 
they secure more credit by offering to pay higher interest rate. In such cases, liquidity can become a 
constraint and most binding where the access to credit is limited by consideration inherent either in the 
design of credit programmes or those that arise out of the skewed socio- economic and political 
structure which diverted such credit away from those that need it. (Malik, 1999) 
It was important to note, however, that credit constrain (of which rationing is a special case) 
would arise even if there were no government intervention in credit markets. There are three stylized 
facts about credit markets which make it quite likely that even unregulated credit markets can easily be 
constrained (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). The facts are: i) screening problem: Borrowers differ in the 
likelihood that they will default, and it is costly to determine the extent borrower’s risk; ii) Incentives 
problem: It is costly to ensure that borrowers take those actions which make repayment most likely; 
and iii) Enforcement problem: It is difficult to compel repayment. 
The upshot is that “interest rates may not equilibrate credit supply and demand; there may be 
credit rationing, and in period of bad harvest, lending may be unavailable at any price (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1990) 
There were several questions regarding agricultural credit which solicit answers. The questions 
are: what is the nominal interest rate reported by respondents? What is the borrowing behavior of the 
respondents at this interest rate? Are farmers really credit constrained? How the credit constraints are 
determined? How the credit constraints affecting the consumption pattern of the farm households? 
How the credit constraints affecting the farm production of the farmers? In order to provide answer 
these and related questions, some simplifying assumptions were made. First of all, if a household was 
constrained in the formal market, then, credit being fungible, it must be constrained overall. Therefore, 
the present paper focused on the market of institutional credit. 
 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The two data set were utilized for the analysis in this paper. The data from Pakistan Rural Household 
Survey (PRHS) 2001 comprising 2642 households from 16 districts of Pakistan was taken to identify 
the credit constraints. In addition, household and farm survey of 160 farm households was conducted 
in summer 2007 from Sargodha region, Punjab. 
In the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS 2001), a number of questions were asked to 
determine the factors affecting the use of institutional credit in Pakistan. These ranged from the reasons 
for not applying credit to a formal institutions, distance of the bank, interest rates of the institutions, 
time lapsed between application and loan disbursement, purpose of loan, formal institutions and 
collateral used for the loan from the institutional sources. These were the issues that covered the wide 
range of problems affecting the institutional credit structure in Pakistan. The respondent’s response 
highlighted the relative importance of each constraining factor. These perceptions were ascertained in 
most cases from the experience of the rural credit and non-credit users. In the present study, the data 
were disaggregated according to agro climatic zones. The classification of the districts of into agro-
climatic zones was based on Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (1989). This classification 
highlighted the different areas that would need to be addressed when designing policies of these 
regions. 
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2.1 Methodology 
The demand for borrowing suffers from two problems namely truncation bias because of external 
borrowing; and implicit interest rate. In order to address these problems Iqbal, 1986 showed a 
procedure for imputing interest rate for non responsive respondents from an interest rate function 
regressed over personal and binary variables. However, in estimating such functions the data on 
households reporting interest rate might create problem. The econometric literature provides an 
opportunity to adjust for selection bias which is well reflected in the seminal work of Heckman (1979). 
Thus, the present chapter was an extension of Heckman’s procedure. 
The problem, simply stated, there was some underlying selection process that warranted 
explicitly accounted for in the econometric framework when estimating from the data on economic 
agents who already opted to behave one way or the other. The data available for analysis were after the 
fact i.e. after some underlying process of selection already took place. This implied that some 
households decided to transact in the credit market for their borrowing and others did not. The 
underlying selection process in this case postulated on the basis of presence or absence of a credit 
constraint. 
The elements of the Heckman approach were laid out as follows. 
The model was: 
0i i i i iy x if xβ ε β ε′ ′= + + >  
= 0i if xβ ε′ + ≤  (1) 
Where: 
yi = the dependent variable and the xi were regressors. In addition, there was a censoring 
indicator, zi which was as follows: zi = 1 if yi > 0 and : zi = 1 if yi ≤ 0. It was expressed that: 
1i i i iE y z xβ σλ′⎡ = ⎤ = +⎣ ⎦  (2) 
Where λ i is the inverse Mill’s Ratio defined as: 
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Where: φ  and Φ  were, respectively, the probability density function (p.d.f.) and cumulative 
density function (c.d.f.) of the standard normal distribution. Here value of the λ i depends on β  and 
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The second step was to estimate OLS on: 
ˆ
i i iy xβ σλ ξ′= + +  (6) 
For non-limit observations, i.e. yi > 0. It should be noted, however, that the estimator found 
from the Heckman procedure was consistent and asymptotically normal, it was not efficient. 
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Furthermore, “the replacement of λ i with λˆ  led to hetroskedasticity and, therefore, to biased and 
inconsistent calculated standard errors”. 
In applying the Heckman approach to the problem, firstly define the censoring indicator INT as 
follows: 
INT = 1 if interest > 0 
= 0 otherwise. 
From this indicator one can define a variable MAXINT as follows: 
MAXINT = β ′  Xi + Ui if INT = 1 
= 0 otherwise 
Where MAXINT was the highest nominal interest rate reported by a household from among its 
current loans. 
The following three step procedure was followed. First, a Logit regression of INT was run on 
the following variables: 
(i) Land owned: Acres of land owned by the household 
(ii) Education of males: The maximum educational level among male members of the 
household 
(iii) Dependency ratio: The ratio of the household size to the number of adult males 
(iv) Source dummy: A dummy variable for the source of the loan, which was specified as one if 
the source was an official lending agency otherwise zero 
(v) Transitory income: A measure of transitory income, defined as a difference between 
estimated food expenditure and the value of farm production 
Secondly, the Inverse Mill’s Ratio was computed and added as the explanatory variable in the 
regression of MAXINT on the explanatory variable listed above. Thirdly, the demand for borrowing 
(BORR) was estimated by using the predicted interest rate from the second stage as additional 
regressors, together with the variables given above, with the exception of the dummy variable for 
source of loan. 
1 2
a
i iBORR Xα α= +  (Predicted MAXINTi)+ εi 
Where: variables included were (i) to (v) with the exception of (iv) and BORR was defined as 
external borrowing minus external lending plus or minus change in assets which were obtained as the 
sum of net deposits in financial institutions; expenditure on the furniture; appliances and other 
durables; less receipt from the sale of property. 
Ultimately there were two systems of equations, the borrowing equation and the interest rate 
equation, and two endogenous variables (BORR, MAXINT) and three sets of exogenous variables 
(Xi, aiX ). Both equations were exactly identified. 
 
2.2. Determination of Credit Constraints 
In order to estimate the constraints, Heckman (1979) technique was used to estimate a Logit model for 
the probability that the households was constrained as a first stage and then using the inverse of Mill’s 
Ratio from the first stage as a right hand side variable in the regression to explain the borrowing 
behavior of farm households as the adjustment factor to adjust for selectivity bias. The dependent 
variable in the second stage was the total amount borrowed per farm households. 
The Logit model was used to estimate the probability that a household was constrained includes 
the following variable: 
(i) Land value: Value of land owned. 
(ii) Value of farm implements: This includes value of owned farm tools, livestock; tube 
well, tractor and tractor drawn implements  
(iii) Number of dependents: Number of family member under sixteen years of age 
(iv) Farm experience: Years of farm experience of head of households. 
(v) Initial liquid assets: This includes total value of grain in store, value of assets and 
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earning from sale of assets and property. 
(vi) Previous year’s income: Previous year’s income. 
The inverse Mill’s ratio were estimated from the above analysis and introduced as an 
explanatory variable to estimate borrowing behavior of farm households. The dependent variable in 
this equation was the gross amount borrowed by a household from all sources and for all purposes over 
the previous year i.e. without deducting any repayments. The additional variables used in the second 
stage were as follows: 
(i) Operational holding: Total operational holding in acres. 
(ii) Dependency ratio: Ratio of family under sixteen to total household size. 
(iii) Education level: Maximum level of education of male family members. 
(iv) Savings: Net deposits in financial institutional.  
 
2.3. Household Total Consumption Expenditures 
The simple regression model was used to estimate the impact of credit constraints on household total 
consumption by regressing on following variables; Education Level, Value of Implements, Operational 
Holding (Acres), dependency Ratio, Tehsil dummies, predicted probability of being constrained 
 
 
3.  Results and Discussion 
3.1 Perception and attitude to institutional credit 
Before presenting a formal definition of constrained households and carrying out the analysis along the 
lines suggested above, a detailed examination of perception of and attitudes to institutional credit was 
necessitated to gain some understanding of how households was being constrained in the institutional 
credit market. 
 
3.2. Constraints from formal institutions 
The respondents were asked to state the most important reason for not applying for loan from a formal 
institution. Of the eight reasons listed, five were classified as reasons that affect the demand side, 
namely: i) do not need; ii) involves paying bribe; iii) inadequate collateral; iv) private sources 
sufficient; and v) do not want to pay interest (“Riba”) 
The additional three reasons were categorized as affecting the supply side. These were: i) 
cumbersome procedure; ii) lenders too far away; and iii) expensive procedures. The third category was 
used to capture cases where the respondent felt that there was more than one reason or the reason not 
listed in seven discussed above. The analysis revealed that on supply side, 9 percent of respondents 
pointed out cumbersome procedure and nearly 29 percent narrated that they do not need credit. The 
results were consistent with Carter, (1988); Carter and Weibe (1990). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).These 
are issues that can be quite easily addressed by policy. For instance effective publicity coupled with 
further simplification of method especially security would help remove such constraints. This would 
increase wakefulness among the farmers and also reduce concealed operational costs. 
On the demand side, nearly 28 percent reported unacceptable or inadequate collateral, and 29 
percent indicated no need and disliked borrowing (religious reasons) as the most important reasons. 
Nearly five percent stated that private (non institutional) sources were sufficient. The inadequate 
collateral also covered a large number of cases of ‘unacceptable’ collateral. Land was the most readily 
acceptable form of collateral and this prevented a large number of tenants and land less people from 
participating in the formal credit markets. There were large regional differences in the ordering of the 
various credit constraint reasons which reflected the relative poverty of the different regions. The 
results were consistent with Boucher, et. al., (2005) and Zeller, et. al., (1997). 
The results further showed that in Cotton-Wheat Sindh, Low intensity Punjab; and Cotton-
Wheat Punjab zones, 52 percent, 44 percent and 42 percent respondent cited inadequate collateral as 
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the most constraining factor in obtaining credit from the formal sources respectively. In NWFP 
province, 63 percent of the farmers indicated that they do not want to pay interest. 
 
3.3. Collateral used by the respondents for the agricultural loan 
Inadequate collateral or lack of it implied that some individuals were denied credit. In this regard, the 
farmers were asked about the collateral used by them for the credit. Among the all possible options for 
collateral include but not limited to: i) none; ii) agricultural land; iii) residential or commercial 
property; iv) other ornaments/utensils/consumer durables; v); Gold; vi) guarantee by landlord; vii) 
guarantee by relative/friend/neighbor; viii) guarantee by employer; and ix) any other source. It was 
evident from the analysis that about 77 percent farmers used agricultural land as collateral for the loan 
which was acceptable by the all institutional sources. This showed how much farmers were bound to 
use land as collateral and the others have negligible share. The results were consistent with Banerjee 
(2001). This can also be seen across the regions that farmers were highly dependent upon land. It was 
obvious that alternative forms of collateral were imperative to increase the access of the tenant and 
poor rural households to institutional credit. One of the often-suggested ways to get around the 
problem of adequate collateral was through group borrowing and lending. This also enabled the 
enforcement repayment. Unfortunately, Pakistan experience with cooperatives was dismal. 
 
3.4 Purpose of the loan 
The respondents were asked to cite the purpose of the loan taken. The purposes of loan were: i) 
agricultural production; ii) purchase of agricultural land; iii) purchase of tractor; iv) purchase of 
thresher; v) purchase of tube well; vi) purchase of other livestock; vii) other agricultural costs; viii) 
food/clothing; ix) medical expenses; x) marriage/death or other ceremonial expenses; xi) 
marriage/death or other ceremonial expenses; xii) purchase of consumer durables; and xiii) purchase or 
improvement of family dwelling; xiv) to pay off old loans; and xv) for non-agricultural production. 
Among all the purposes, the agricultural production was found as 45.8 percent. It was followed by 
purchase of tractor 8.5 percent and purchase of land 6.1 percent all other have share less than six 
percent. Across the agro-climatic regions, most of the loans were for the agricultural production only 
but in Balochistan 50 percent of the loan was for the purchase of agricultural land. The results were 
consistent with Malik (1999), Irfan, et. al., (1999) and Qureshi, et al. (1996) 
 
3.5 Formal institutions for credit 
The respondents were asked about the formal institutions that they used for formal loaning. The formal 
institutions were: i) Commercial Banks; ii) Zarai Tarqaiti Bank (ZTBL) (defunct Agricultural 
Development Bank); iii) Women’s Bank; vi) Non-governmental organizations; v) House Building and 
finance corporation vi) others (Cooperatives). The entire share in this regard was covered by ZTBL 
which was 86.3 percent. ZTBL was providing most of the loan to the farmers for their agricultural 
needs. This was not only in one region, it was found more than 70 percent loan provided by ZTBL. So 
there is a dire need to strengthen this institution for the proper agricultural loaning. 
 
3.6 Interest rate and the response of the farmers 
The most important issue related to decision making of the farmers for the loan was interest rate. It 
represented the cost of borrowing at margin of the household from the data; the average interest rate 
was calculated for all the agro-climatic regions. The interest was floating between 10 to 20 percent. But 
amazingly it was found higher in Barani Punjab to the extent of 20 percent which was followed by 
Balochistan 17 percent. The results were consistent with Malik (1999). In order to check the response 
of the farmers and their ability to re-pay loan, following two interesting questions were asked; i) if you 
were offered a higher interest rate, would you borrow less? ii) if you were offered a larger loan at the 
same interest rate, would you borrow more? For the first question more than 50 percent respondents 
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replied positively which showed that the farmers have the ability to repay even at the higher rate of 
interest. Duca and Rosenthal (993) argued that a farm household was credit constrained only when it 
would like to borrow more than lenders allow or if its preferred demand for credit exceeds the amount 
lenders are willing to supply. Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), on the other hand, described credit constraints 
in two terms -- redlining and credit rationing. Therefore, they must be treated as customer not a 
beneficiary. For the second question farmers’ response was negative that showed that the farmers were 
not able to exhaust all their resources and they were not diversifying agriculture. 
 
3.7 Time Lag in disbursement of loan 
There was one probable problem that could arise even if a loan was granted by an institution. Was the 
loan became available in time and what was the time lag? This affected the eventual productivity of 
such loan especially where short run loans were concerned. A fertilizer loan, for example, if not made 
available on time would be useless to the farmer. The main reason for the delayed disbursement of 
loans was as non-cooperation and lengthy procedure. It was inferred from the analysis that most of 
loans were sanctioned and disbursed in a period of 1-3 months. Across the agro-climatic regions, more 
than 75 percent credit was disbursed in one quarter except Balochistan. Though the figures were 
acceptable but in Pakistan majority of loans were for short-term production with a per acre upper limit. 
 
3.8 Distance of the Bank 
Education, health condition, fixed assets holding and distance from household to formal bank branch 
were among the most impor¬tant factors affecting household’s credit activities. In the present study, 
the distance of the formal bank was measured in the form of kilometers from the community. It was 
found that the distance of the formal bank was more than 20 Kim’s in 28.8 percent of area. The 
percentage of more than 20 Kim’s was 81.3 percent in Balochistan which was clear indication of 
backwardness and poverty stricken. The government must develop policies for these remote areas to 
exploit the resources and to increase productivity of agriculture sector. 
 
 
4.  Demand for Borrowing and Interest Rate Function 
Before discussing the results, first there was a need to explain the rationale for using these explanatory 
variables as discussed above. Xi is a vector of all personal variables. The vector Xi includes variables 
that influence the opportunity, administrative and risk costs of borrowing. These three types of cost 
determine the normal interest rate. The variable associated with opportunity cost was the presence of 
government regulated lending agencies in villages. Such agencies provided loans at below market rates 
of interest. Their presence in the village reduced the average interest rate. The dummy variable for the 
source of a loan was used to capture this effect. Village population could have been used as a proxy for 
the administrative cost of lending because the larger the loan, the smaller the unit cost of 
administrating it, but unfortunately this information was not available. The risk cost was explained by 
income earning and loan repayment ability of a farm household. These were determined by, for 
example, total land owned, maximum educational level of households males, dependency ratio, 
transitory income. Land owned is a measure of the household’s endowments; the educational level of 
male household is a measure of the investment opportunities available to the household, as well as its 
ability to cope with the cumbersome paperwork and administrative details required for getting loans 
from official agencies; the dependency ratio is a measure of the household’s stage in its life cycle, and 
therefore of its need for current consumption; and finally (v) transitory income variable, was indented 
to capture variations in the demand for credit arising out of windfall gains and losses. From the 
permanent income hypotheses, if a household was not on its optimal consumption path, perhaps 
because it was credit constrained, it treated such windfall gains as a substitute for credit, where as 
household (e.g., of large landlords) treated such gains as a complement to credit. 
Agricultural Credit Constraints and Borrowing Behavior of Farmers in Rural Punjab 301 
 
4.1 Model Results 
The results were obtained in Table 1 which revealed that most of the coefficients were having expected 
signs but were not significant except source dummy(p=0.01). This showed that institutional sources 
were active in loaning, thus likely to pay interest. On the demand side it will reduce the transaction cost 
of the farmer. The results were consistent with Carter (1988); Carter and Weibe (1990), Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), and Malik (1999). 
After estimating the above Logit model, the inverse Mill Ratio’s were computed and added as 
an independent variable in the above mentioned logit model. The results were revealed in Table 2. 
Again most of the parameters showed expected sign but not really significant. However, it was 
interesting to note that source dummy was not significant in the interest rate equation. This showed that 
borrowing from institutional sources was not important in lowering the overall mark up. The 
respondents mostly banked on informal sources (i.e. commission agents; money lenders, input 
suppliers, etc.). The Inverse Mill’s Ratio was calculated to control the selection bias in the subsequent 
analysis and thus, introduced in the model as an explanatory variable. The coefficient was having 
expected sign but the coefficient was not significant... The results were consistent with Malik (1999) 
who used a panel data from International Food Policy Research Institute to prove above assertions. 
Later on the borrowing function was estimated with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the 
results were shown in Table 3. The results showed that the coefficients of transitory income, education 
level, and predicted interest rate were significant with expected sign. The transitory income was 
anticipated to capture variations in the demand for credit arising out from the windfall gains and losses. 
As envisaged from the permanent income hypothesis, if a household is not on its optimal consumption 
path because of its credit constraints, it will treat such gains as a substitute for credit, whereas 
households (e.g., of large landlords) will treat such gains as complement to credit. The results were 
supporting the same phenomenon in Pakistan credit market. The coefficient of maximum education of 
household males, which measures the household’s ability to cope with the procedure required for 
getting loans, has expected sign and significantly different from zero which implied that education 
played a significant role in borrowing decision and reducing the transaction cost of the credit. Most 
importantly and encouraging was that predicted interest rate showed expected sign (negative) and was 
significant (p=0.10). 
However, the model can predict the price for the credit which has an overall effect on the 
demand for credit. The land owned found with expected sign but statistically non-significant. This was 
consistent with the behavior of Pakistan credit market, where land was most important form of 
collateral, but which was never seized in reality by the lending agency in the event of default. The land 
title merely provided an entry into the credit market and nothing else. The interest rate charged and the 
amount borrowed depended upon other considerations. The coefficient of wage rate was as expected 
positive but non significant. Intuitively with higher wage rate there was more ability to pay high 
interest rate and more liberty in borrowing. But in Pakistan’s labour market, the wage rate was too low 
to provide the liberty to households for additional borrowing. Since wage rate was a good proxy for 
ability to repay. In these circumstances it was why such households should be charged a higher interest 
rate. This was mainly due to monopoly power of informal lender, who charged at their own will. The 
coefficient of dependency ratio showed expected sign but insignificant. If the ratio of the adult males to 
household size was greater, the household will borrow more but in Pakistan the households mainly 
depend upon sole earner which reduced the ability to pay interest rate and borrowing. The tehsil 
dummies were found significant which implied that all the revenue units have good quality of land and 
thus same pattern of borrowing was followed in all the areas. 
The important contribution of the estimated model was the confirmation that household and 
loan characteristics and area effects can be used to predict the price of credit... Therefore, the results of 
the study must be carefully interpreted because of underlying assumptions of the model. The 
assumptions were the credit market was dichotomous, however in reality there are several segments of 
the credit market. Furthermore, the analysis does not explicitly include differential borrowing behavior 
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of the respondents due to credit constraints. Similarly, the imputed interest rate assumed consistent 
behavior across the respondents and this may not hold true due to credit constraints. 
 
4.2. Determinants of Credit Constraints 
In this section, differential behavior of respondents due to credit constraints was analyzed through the 
estimation of a logit model. The results revealed (Table 5) that the probability that household was 
constrained by land value, value of farm implements, farm experience, dependency ratio, operational 
holding, educational level and savings. As expected, the probability being constrained was dependent 
negatively on value of land, farm experience, savings, and educational level. Among all these 
variables, the value of land was found significant which showed that the probability of being 
constrained reduced as the value of land increased and this was a common characteristic of Pakistan 
credit market. The land was acceptable collateral and credit amount assessed on the basis of its value. 
The value of farm implements depicted positive sign and significant which was counter-intuitive. All 
other variable were not significantly different from zero. These were the results of Logit estimation 
(First Stage). 
This led us to estimate the Inverse Mill’s Ratio which was included as independent variable in 
the borrowing function along with other independent variables. The interest rate was not included 
among the independent variables. Thus, Heckman two steps procedure was applied to estimate the 
parameter. The dependent variable was gross amount borrowed from all the sources over the previous 
year without deducting any repayments. The results revealed that land value and savings in the 
financial institutions was a negative function of total amount borrowed. The results found counter 
intuitive. The results were consistent with Malik (999). Total borrowing per household was positively 
and significantly dependent upon initial liquid assets. One can expect that higher the initial liquid 
assets, lower tends to be the borrowing. The results suggested that higher level of initial liquid assets 
leads to higher borrowing. This could be the result of characteristics of Pakistan credit market which 
was dominated by large farmers. It was interesting to note that the educational level in the household, 
its operational holding and the dependency ratio have seemingly no impact on its aggregate borrowing 
behavior. Tehsil dummies were also found significant showing the same borrowing pattern. Most 
importantly the Inverse Mill’s Ratio found positive and significant which suggested that coefficients of 
the model were reliable and unbiased. The results of the study were consistent with Malik (1999) and 
Nguyen (2007). However, some of the variables were at variance with this study. 
 
4.3. The credit constraint and household consumption Expenditure 
How does the credit constraint affect the total consumption expenditure of the farm household? In 
order to aforementioned, total consumption expenditure was regressed with educational level, value of 
implements, operational holdings, dependency ratio, tehsil dummies. The results were presented in 
Table 6. The probability of being constrained was positively and significantly determined by 
operational holding and value of implements. It was negatively determined by dependency ratio which 
was unexpected. It was negatively determined by probability of being constrained but not significant in 
the estimated results. 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The agricultural credit programmes through institutional sources has checkered history. In spite 
quantum increase in credit, its impact on farm productivity was not well documented. There were 
conflicting views on the performance of agricultural credit schemes. The farmers were facing a lot of 
constraints. This paper highlights the credit constraints and identifies the determinants of these 
constraints. The result revealed that collateral was one of the major constraints. Land was only 
collateral acceptable to institutional sources of credit. Thus, the tenants and share croppers were left out 
of the credit programmes. 
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Lastly Heckman two steps procedure was followed to estimate interest rate and borrowing 
functions of the respondents. In summary, three step procedures was followed, first logit regression 
was estimated to ascertain the probability that positive interest was charged. Secondly the interest rate 
was regressed with several explanatory variables coupled with inverse mill ratio from the first stage. 
Thirdly, the demand for borrowing was regressed on predicted interest rate coupled with second stage 
while including some other explanatory variables. The land coefficient was not significant. The 
coefficient of education of male household was significant showing that education function as a 
facilitator to enter into credit market and reducing transaction cost. Transitory income also played a 
significant role in borrowing behavior. In the total amount borrowing model, initial liquid assets 
significantly impacted the amount of borrowing. Operational holding was significantly affecting the 
total household consumption expenditure. 
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